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China’s financial development and economic growth is achieved under weak legal institutions. The 
literature attributes this counterexample of law–finance–growth nexus to a) alternative 
mechanisms in China such as incentives, reputation and relationships and b) a well-functioning 
xinfang system with common law features. In recent years, China has made increasing efforts to 
strengthen its rule of law. The Communist Party of China (CPC) has taken the lead by launching 
a far-reaching campaign against corruption, establishing a system of inspection tours, and 
promulgating a large number of regulations. We argue that using regulations to complement laws 
is effective: CPC has enough bureaucratic prowess to crack down on corruption whereas the courts 
are subject to subversion by powerful interests. We also discuss the drawbacks of this appraoch: 
regulations aiming at ex ante control of corruption substantially increase procedural formalism and 
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1. Introduction 
 2018 marks 40th anniversary of China’s reform and opening-up. In 1978, China was largely 
an agricultural country. Around 81% of its population lived in countryside and 82% were in 
absolute poverty. In the following four decades, the Chinese economy exhibited exceptional 
performance. The average GDP growth rate reached 9.6%, making China 2nd largest economy in 
the world and lifting 700 million people out of poverty. China’s stock exchanges were not opened 
until 1990, but its stock market has become the world’s second-biggest since 2014. Having said 
these achievements, legal institutions in China remain weak. The Corruption Perceptions Index by 
Transparency International and Rule of Law Index by World Justice Project place China the 87th 
and 75th in the world in 2018 respectively.  
 Given the importance of legal institutions to promote financial development (e.g. La Porta 
et al., 1997; 1998) and in turn economic growth (e.g., Coase, 1960; North and Thomas, 1973; King 
and Levine, 1993), China provides a counterexample to the conventional wisdom. Allen et al. (2005; 
2013) argue that using law in finance and commerce is a Western idea and can be optimal in static 
environments; in the dynamic environment like China, however, it may be better to use other 
mechanisms such as reputation, financial incentive and connections which can reduce 
inefficiencies of laws associated with political economy factors. An et al. (2016) refer to an 
alternative formal institution in China, namely xinfang system, that plays key roles in addressing a 
wide array of commercial, contractual, property, and financial disputes. Xinfang system handles 
more cases than the judicial system and has advantages in its efficiency, independence and 
adaptability.  
 Nonetheless, Xi Jinping has pledged to promote rule of law and to enforce law-based 
governance in all areas, believing they are critical to achieve the "Two Centenary Goals" i.e. to 
build a moderately prosperous society by the time the CPC celebrates its centenary in 2021 and to 
turn China into a modern socialist country by the time the People's Republic of China celebrates 
its centenary in 2049. CPC, and its Central Commission for Discipline Inspection in particular, 
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have played a leading role to implement this initiative to build the rule of law in China. To do so, 
CPC has issued a large number of regulations to discipline the daily activities of cadres including 
public servants, managers in state-owned enterprises and academics in universities among others, 
making the Chinese society vastly more regulated. Today, public expenses, event planning, 
business trips and reimbursement follow heavily regulated procedures. Is regulation a good idea? 
Should judges or regulators enforce law and order? This paper discusses the benefits and 
unintended consequence of China’s regulation approach to improve institutions in achieving its 
further development.  
The reminder of the paper proceeds as follows. Section 2 introduces the articles in this 
special issue; Section 3 discusses the rationale of China to institute more regulations; Section 4 
discuss the problems to be addressed and Section 5 concludes.  
 
2. Introduction of the Special Issue 
China continues to carry forward reforms, as the 19th Communist Party of China (CPC) 
National Congress in 2017 set a timetable for China’s ultimate economic goal. China aims to 
basically realize socialist modernization by 2035 and to become a leading global power by 2050. 
To study the challenges in China’s development, Chinese Economic Association (CEA, 
UK/Europe) jointly with Journal of Chinese Economic and Business Studies (JCEBS), the official journal 
of CEA, organised two conferences at the University of Edinburgh (22-23 June) and Tsinghua 
University (9-10 Sep) in 2018 respectively. 2018 also marks the 30th anniversary of CEA and the 
15 anniversary of JCEBS. CEA was founded in 1988 in London by overseas Chinese economists, 
many of whom served as the advisors of the China’s economic reforms in 1980s. 
Based on these two events, JCEBS publishes this special issue with five articles, covering 
the topical issues of income disparity, infrastructure, globalisation and legal institutions.  Zhang 
and Zhao (2019) argue that China’s falling Gini coefficients since 2009 may have resulted from 
the omission of unreported income of wealthy families. Chen et al. (2019) argue that find that 
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urbanization in China has contributed to the reduction in income disparity which is largely driven 
by the income gap between rural and urban residents. Zhang et a. (2019) studies China’s rapid 
development of infrastructure and find that the high-speed rail has stimulated China’s fixed assets 
investment and foreign direct investment. Wang (2019) discussed China’s active role in achieving 
shared growth, engaging in global governance and participating in rule-setting in the era of 
globalization 4.0, which is shaped by the fusion of advanced technologies and the shift to a 
multipolar world. Zhang (2019) tests the two opposite interpretations of China’s economic success 
of past four decades: China model view Vs the universal model view. He finds that China’s success 
is attributed to the marketization and development of non-state sectors rather than the strong 
power of government and the state sector.  
 
3. The Rise of Regulation 
The Central Commission for Discipline Inspection of CPC†, the highest internal control 
institution of the Party, has been substantially empowered in Xi Administration to lead the 
signature anti-corruption campaign aiming to crack down both corrupt high-level and local cadres. 
It also co-ordinates with the Organization Department of CPC to implement on-site inspection 
tours on governments, state-owned enterprises (SOEs) and universities to inspect the enforcement 
of internal regulations of the Party. Due to the underdevelopment of legislation, CCP and Chinese 
governments mainly rely on the issuance and enforcement of a large number of internal regulations 
at various levels and ad hoc notifications to strengthen institutions. This is against Coase’s “free 
market” idea of establishing law and order: private property right protection should rely on 
litigation rather than regulations.  
We argue that there are at least three good reasons for the Party to institute more 
regulations.  First, litigation is less vulnerable to subversion than litigation. The career concerns of 
 
† It was merged with the National Supervisory Commission of China, the highest anti-corruption agency in 2018.  
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the officials at the Central Commission for Discipline Inspection protect them from succumbing 
to outside influence; Second, regulations focus on precautions i.e. ex ante control of corruption; 
Third, public regulators have better expertise and motivation to pursue social objectives than 
judges (Shleifer, 2005). During the Progressive Era from 1890s to the 1920s, the United States also 
increasing used regulations to control market behaviour. Landis (1938) sees regulations during 
New Deal in the United States (US) between 1933 and 1936 as a political response to the failure 
of litigation. Glaeser et al. (2001) attribute the rapid development of securities markets of Poland 
to its highly motivated regulator and stringent regulations.  
Glaeser and Shleifer (2003) consider choice of private litigation and government 
regulations as alternative mechanisms of controlling market behaviours and develop a theory of 
law enforcement. Their finding is as follows: a) Developed countries that have achieved highest 
levels of law and order should rely on private litigation rather than the less efficient regulations; b) 
In countries with weak law and order where judges and regulators are vulnerable to political 
pressure and bribes, the optimal government policy is to institute fewer regulations because justice 
will be subverted; c) in an environment with intermediate law and order, regulation is desirable. 
We argue that since China has intermediate enforcement capacity, regulations combined with 
litigation could be a good solution of improving institutions. The Commission for Discipline 
Inspection of CPC is less likely to be subverted than courts; and the regulations that restrict corrupt 
conduct reduces cost of identifying violations can enhance enforcement and overall efficiency 
(Glaeser and Shleifer, 2001).  
The benefits of the regulation approach are empirically supported by some early evidence 
based on the short-run market reaction and firms’ response. The anti-corruption campaign triggers 
positive market reactions on SOEs (Lin et al., 2016), reduces corporate fraud (Zhang, 2018), 
increases R&D investment and patents (Xu and Yano, 2017), optimizes credit reallocation between 
SOEs and non-SOEs (Li et al., 2018), and reduces discount when local government sell land to 
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Princelings (Chen and Kung, 2018). However, none of the studies in the literature quantitatively 
studies regulations issued around the campaign and we encourage future research on this topic.   
 
4. The Problem of Procedural Formalism  
Following the anti-corruption campaign, the Chinese society has become vastly more 
regulated. New regulations are issued at various levels on weekly basis; and some outdated 
regulations are enforced again without being revised timely. For example, Shanghai is the 6th most 
expensive city in the world by annual cost of living by Mercer, but a regulation from the Ministry 
of Finance only permits accommodation that costs no more than 500 Yuan/night for cadres, 
managers of SOEs and academics on business trips to Shanghai. Reimbursement also requires 
more approvals and evidence. Cadres now spend significant time to fill out forms and write report 
because regulations have substantially increased procedural formalism. The effects of the 
procedural formalism are controversial (Dijankov et al, 2003). On the one hand, it advances benign 
political goal and deter subversion by powerful interests; one the other hand, it brings about 
unnecessary burdens such as extreme costs and delays. The net effects of procedural formalism 
represent a timely and important research question.  
To measure procedural formalism, Djankov et al. (2003) construct an index on the 
operation of litigation and find that it determines the performance of courts. The major motives 
for the government to regulate civil procedures are to control the outcome and to avoid subversion 
by the powerful. The important finding is that the procedural formalism, which is systematically 
greater in civil law countries, brings about the cost of longer proceedings but not better justice: In 
fact, higher formalism is associated with lower quality of the legal system. Likewise, Djankov et al. 
(2002) show that heavier regulation of entry is associated with higher corruption but not better 
quality of public or private goods. Botero et al. (2004) find that heavier regulation of labor is 
associated with lower labor force participation and higher unemployment.  
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While the regulation approach in China reduces the room of corruption and other 
misconducts, it at least brings about two problems. First, it substantially increases the bureaucracy 
and paperwork of cadre, holding back their efficiency and motivation. Second, some regulations 
are too specific, eliminating the discretion of cadres to make decisions in accordance with local 
conditions. We encourage future research to construct indices to measure the trend of procedural 
formalism and to conduct fieldwork to reveal the insights of the unnecessary burdens associated 
with the anti-corruption campaign. The results will be very helpful for the Party and governments 
to optimize regulations.  
The discretion of local cadres was found to be very important for China’s development.  
The Chinese political system combines decentralized economic governance and centralized 
political governance to foster economic growth (Xu, 2011). With respect to decentralized 
economic governance, local governments influence the allocation and use of resources, the 
provision of public goods, infrastructure, and law enforcement, and the initiation and 
implementation of local regulations and reforms (Chen and Kung, 2018). As discussed in Qian 
and Xu (1993) and Maskin et al. (2000), decentralized economic governance systems tend to be 
more effective at generating economic growth than centralized systems. Extensive regulations and 
the system of inspection tours make China’s political structure more centralized and may harm the 
economic growth over the long run.  
The problems of regulation approach in China are not trivial because they could offset the 
benefits. To what extent the Party and governments can be addressed them determines the success 
of China’s efforts to uphold rule of law. Although some short-run benefits of China’s anti-
corruption campaign was documented, Griffin et al. (2018) point out that there have been little 
overall decreases in measures of potential corporate corruption apart from reported entertainment 
expenditures. China’s ranking in the control of corruption index by Transparency International in 
fact dropped from 80th to 87th from 2012 to 2018, indicating the little improvement or deterioration 
in corruption perceptions. 
 8 
5. Conclusion  
 
While China has achieved its growth miracle in the absence of strong legal institutions, Xi 
administration has increasingly emphasized the importance of rule of law. The revised constitution 
of the CPC in 2017 specifies CPC’s pronged comprehensive strategies including to fully advance 
the law-based governance of China and to strengthen Party self-governance in every respect. The 
Party aims to strengthen the implementation of law and to bring all the work of the state under 
the rule of law. 
This paper introduces the special issue based on two conferences to celebrate CEA’s 30th 
anniversary and JCEBS’ 15th anniversary, and discuss the rational and problems of China’s 
regulation approach to strengthen its institutions. While some short-run evidence suggest that the 
Party’s efforts have been effective to some extent, the regulation approach also brings about non-
trivial problems of formalism which could at least partially offset the benefits over the long run. 
We encourage future studies to measure the formalism associated with regulations during the anti-
corruption campaign in China and evaluate its long-term economic impact. The findings will make 
important policy implications for the Party and governments to optimize the regulation approach 




Allen, F., Qian, J., & Qian, M. (2005). Law, finance, and economic growth in China. Journal of 
financial economics, 77(1), 57-116. 
Allen, F., Carletti, E., & Valenzuela, P. (2013). Financial intermediation, markets, and alternative 
financial sectors. In Handbook of the Economics of Finance (Vol. 2, pp. 759-798). Elsevie 
An, J. and Danbolt, J. and Hou, W. and Levine, R. (2016). Law and finance in China: The role of 
xinfang. Working Paper. Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2903599 
Botero, J. C., Djankov, S., Porta, R. L., Lopez-de-Silanes, F., & Shleifer, A. (2004). The regulation 
of labor. The Quarterly Journal of Economics, 119(4), 1339-1382. 
Chen, J., Pu, M. and Hou, W. (2019) The trend of the Gini coefficient of China, Journal of Chinese 
Economic and Business Studies, this issue 
Chen, T., & Kung, J. K. S. (2018). Busting the “Princelings”: The campaign against corruption in 
China’s primary land market. The Quarterly Journal of Economics, 134(1), 185-226. 
Coase, R. H. (1960). The problem of social cost. In Classic papers in natural resource economics 
(pp. 87-137). Palgrave Macmillan, London. 
Djankov, S., La Porta, R., Lopez-de-Silanes, F., & Shleifer, A. (2002). The regulation of entry. The 
quarterly Journal of economics, 117(1), 1-37. 
Djankov, S., La Porta, R., Lopez-de-Silanes, F., & Shleifer, A. (2003). Courts. The Quarterly 
Journal of Economics, 118(2), 453-517. 
Giannetti, M., Liao, G., You, J., & Yu, X. (2017). The externalities of corruption: Evidence from 
entrepreneurial firms in China. European Corporate Governance Institute (ECGI)-
Finance Working Paper, (536), 17-6. 
Glaeser, E., Johnson, S., & Shleifer, A. (2001). Coase versus the Coasians. The Quarterly Journal 
of Economics, 116(3), 853-899. 
Griffin, J. M., Liu, C., & Shu, T. (2018). Is the Chinese Anti-Corruption Campaign Authentic? 
Working Paper. Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2779429  
 10 
King, R. G., & Levine, R. (1993). Finance and growth: Schumpeter might be right. The quarterly 
journal of economics, 108(3), 717-737. 
La Porta, R., Lopez‐de‐Silanes, F., Shleifer, A., & Vishny, R. W. (1997). Legal determinants of 
external finance. The journal of finance, 52(3), 1131-1150. 
La Porta, R., Lopez-de-Silanes, F., Shleifer, A., & Vishny, R. W. (1998). Law and finance. Journal 
of political economy, 106(6), 1113-1155. 
Landis, J. (1938). The Administrative Process. New Haven: Yale U. Press 
Li, B. and Wang, Z. and Zhou, H. (2018) China’s Anti-Corruption Campaign and Credit 
Reallocation from SOEs to Non-SOEs. PBCSF-NIFR Research Paper No. 17-01. 
Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2908658 
Lin, C., Morck, R., Yeung, B., & Zhao, X. (2016). Anti-corruption reforms and shareholder 
valuations: Event study evidence from China (No. w22001). National Bureau of Economic 
Research. 
Maskin, E., Qian, Y., & Xu, C. (2000). Incentives, information, and organizational form. The 
review of economic studies, 67(2), 359-378. 
North, D. C., & Thomas, R. P. (1973). The rise of the western world: A new economic history. 
Cambridge University Press. 
Qian, Y., & Xu, C. (1993). Why China's economic reforms differ: the M‐form hierarchy and 
entry/expansion of the non‐state sector. Economics of Transition, 1(2), 135-170. 
Shleifer, A. (2005). Understanding regulation. European Financial Management, 11(4), 439-451. 
Shleifer, A., and Glaeser, E. (2001). “A Reason for Quantity Regulation.” American Economic 
Review Papers and Proceedings 91 (2): 431-435. 
Wang, H. (2019) China and Globalization: 40 years of Reform and Opening-up and Globalization 
4.0, Journal of Chinese Economic and Business Studies, this issue 
 11 
Xu, C. (2011). The fundamental institutions of China's reforms and development. Journal of 
economic literature, 49(4), 1076-1151. 
Xu, G., & Yano, G. (2017). How does anti-corruption affect corporate innovation? Evidence from 
recent anti-corruption efforts in China. Journal of comparative Economics, 45(3), 498-519. 
Zhang, F., Yao, S., Wang, F. and Ou, J. (2019) Role of High-speed Rail on Social Fixed Assets 
Investments in China, Journal of Chinese Economic and Business Studies, this issue 
Zhang, J. and Zhao, W (2019), The Unreported Income and Its Impact on Gini Coefficient in 
China, Journal of Chinese Economic and Business Studies, this issue 
Zhang, J. (2018). Public governance and corporate fraud: Evidence from the recent anti-corruption 
campaign in China. Journal of Business Ethics, 148(2), 375-396. 
Zhang, W (2019), The China Model View Is Factually Wrong, Journal of Chinese Economic and Business 
Studies, this issue 
 
 
 
